

1 Climate trends and global crop production since 1980

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8 **Efforts to anticipate how climate change will affect future food availability can benefit from**
9 **understanding the impacts of changes to date. Here we show that in the cropping regions and**
10 **growing seasons of most countries, with the important exception of the United States, temperature**
11 **trends for 1980-2008 exceeded one standard deviation of historic year-to-year variability. Models**
12 **that link yields of the four largest commodity crops to weather indicate that global maize and wheat**
13 **production declined by 3.8% and 5.5%, respectively, compared to a counter-factual without**
14 **climate trends. For soybeans and rice, winners and losers largely balanced out. Climate trends**
15 **were large enough in some countries to offset a significant portion of the increases in average yields**
16 **that arose from technology, CO₂ fertilization, and other factors.**

17 Inflation-adjusted prices for food have shown a significant downward trend over the last century
18 as increases in supply outpaced demand. More recently, food prices have increased rapidly and many
19 observers have attributed this in part to weather episodes, such as the prolonged drought in Australia or
20 the heat waves and wildfires in Russia. However, efforts to model the effects of climate on prices or food
21 availability, even for individual countries, must consider effects throughout the world, given that
22 agricultural commodities are traded worldwide and world market prices are determined by global supply
23 and demand (1-3).

24 Global average temperatures have risen by roughly 0.13 °C decade⁻¹ since 1950 (4), yet the
25 impact this has had on agriculture is not well understood (5). An even faster pace of roughly 0.2 °C
26 decade⁻¹ of global warming is expected over the next 2-3 decades, with substantially larger trends likely
27 for cultivated land areas (4). Understanding the impacts of past trends can help to gauge the importance of
28 near-term climate change for supply of key food commodities. In addition, identifying which particular
29 crops and regions have been most impacted by recent trends would assist efforts to measure and analyze
30 ongoing efforts to adapt.

31 We develop a database of yield response models to evaluate the impact of these recent climate
32 trends on major crop yields at the country scale for 1980-2008. Publicly available datasets on crop
33 production, crop locations, growing seasons, and monthly temperature (T) and precipitation (P) were
34 combined in a panel analysis of four crops (maize, wheat, rice, and soybeans) for all countries in the
35 world (6). These four crops constitute roughly 75% of the calories that humans directly or indirectly
36 consume (7).

37 Time series of average growing season T and P reveal significant positive trends in temperature
38 since 1980 for nearly all major growing regions of maize, wheat, rice, and soybeans (Fig. 1-2, S1-4). To

39 put the magnitude of trends in context, they are normalized by the historical standard deviation (σ) of
40 year-to-year fluctuations (i.e. a T trend of 1.0 means that temperatures at the end of the period were 1.0 σ
41 higher than at the beginning of the period). A notable exception to the warming pattern is the United
42 States, which produces ~40% of global maize and soybean and experienced a slight cooling over the
43 period (Fig. 1). Overall, 65% of countries experienced T trends in growing regions of at least 1 σ for
44 maize and rice, with the number slightly higher (75%) for wheat and lower (53%) for soybean. Roughly
45 one-fourth of all countries experienced trends of more than 2 σ for each crop (Fig. 2). This distribution of
46 trends stands in marked contrast to the 20 years prior to 1980, for which trends were evenly distributed
47 about zero (Fig. 1). Precipitation trends were more mixed across regions and were significantly smaller
48 relative to historical variability in most places. The number of countries with extreme trends reflected the
49 number expected by chance (Fig. 2), indicating no consistent global shift in growing season average P.

50 Translating these climate trends into potential yield impacts requires models of yield response.
51 Here, regression analysis of historical data is used to relate past yield outcomes to weather realizations.
52 All models include T and P, their squares, country-specific intercepts to account for spatial variations in
53 crop management and soil quality, and country-specific time trends to account for yield growth due to
54 technology gains (6). Since our models are non-linear, both year-to-year variations in historical weather
55 as well as the average climate are used for the identification of the coefficients (unlike a linear panel
56 which only uses deviations from the average). However, we do not directly estimate the full set of
57 adaptation possibilities that might occur in the long-term under climate change (8). For this reason, we
58 prefer to view these not as predictions of actual impacts, but rather as a useful measure of the pace of
59 climate change in the context of agriculture. The greater the estimated impacts, the faster adaptation (or
60 any other action to raise yields) would have to occur to offset potential losses.

61 The models exhibited statistically significant sensitivities to T and P that are consistent with
62 process-based crop models and the broader agronomic literature (Fig. S6-7). Given the hill-shaped yield-
63 temperature function, predicted decreases are larger the warmer a country is to begin with. In particular, a
64 1 °C rise tended to lower yields by up to 10% except in high latitude countries, where in particular rice
65 gains from warming. Precipitation increases yields for nearly all crops and countries, up to a point at
66 which further rainfall becomes harmful. Tests of alternate climate datasets and groupings of countries
67 identified some important differences but responses for most countries were robust to these model choices
68 (Fig S8).

69 To estimate yield impacts of climate trends, the statistical models were used to predict annual
70 yields for four scenarios of historical T and P: (i) actual T and actual P for each country for 1980-2008,
71 (ii) actual T and detrended P, (iii) detrended T and actual P, and (iv) detrended T and detrended P. Trends
72 in the difference between (iv) and (i) were used to quantify the impact of historical climate trends,
73 whereas (ii) and (iii) were used to determine the relative contribution of T and P to overall impacts.

74 At the global scale, maize and wheat exhibited negative impacts for several major producers and
75 global net loss of 3.8% and 5.5% relative to what would have been achieved without the climate trends in
76 1980-2008 (Fig. 3, Table 1). In absolute terms, these equal the annual production of maize in Mexico (23
77 MT) and wheat in France (33 MT), respectively. The net impact on rice and soybean was insignificant,
78 with gains in some countries balancing losses in others. Among the largest country-specific losses was

79 wheat in Russia (almost 15%), while the country with largest overall share of crop production (United
80 States) showed no effect due to the lack of significant climate trends.

81 The majority of impacts were driven by trends in T rather than P (Fig. 3). Precipitation is an
82 important driver of interannual variability of yields, and indeed our models often predict a comparable
83 yield change for a 1σ change in P or T (Fig. S7). However, the magnitude of recent T trends (Fig. 2) is
84 larger than those for P in most situations. This finding is consistent with models of future yield impacts of
85 climate change, which indicate that changes in T are more important than changes in P, at least at the
86 national and regional scales (9, 10).

87 Prior studies for individual countries and at the global scale also found that recent trends have
88 depressed maize and wheat yields (5). For example, a recent study of wheat yields in France suggests that
89 climate is an important factor contributing to stagnation of yields since 1990 (11). Similarly, warming
90 trends in India have a well understood negative effect on yields, and are thought to explain part of the
91 slowdown in recent yield gains (12, 13). For rice, the lack of significant impacts is consistent with a
92 recent study of rice in Asia, which showed that past changes in average T had small effects at large scales,
93 in part because of opposing influence of nighttime and daytime temperatures, and in part because of
94 opposing climate trends in different countries (14). The trends reported in the current study are dependent
95 on the time period used, 1980-2008, but adjustments to this time period do not qualitatively affect the
96 results (Fig. S9). Separating the effects of maximum and minimum temperature, or different treatments of
97 the time trend, also did not significantly alter the conclusions (Fig. S10-S11).

98 Climate is only one factor likely to shape the future (or past) of food supply. It is therefore
99 important to assess how these impacts of climate trends compare to other factors over the same time
100 period. As one measure, we divide the climate-induced yield trend by the overall yield trend for 1980-
101 2008 in each country (Fig. 4). We emphasize that this is a simple metric of the importance of climate
102 relative to all other factors, and does not address the overall pace of yield growth, nor does it separately
103 attribute yield growth to the many technological and environmental factors that influence trends.
104 However, it provides a useful measure of the relative importance of climate, with values of -0.1 indicating
105 that 10 years of climate trend is equivalent to a setback of roughly one year of technology gains.

106 The ratio exhibits wide variation across countries because of differences in both the growth rate
107 of average yields and climate impacts (Fig. 4). Cases where negative climate impacts represent a large
108 fraction of overall yield gains include wheat in Russia, Turkey, and Mexico, and maize in China. Rice
109 production in high latitude regions appears to have benefitted from warming, but latitudinal gradients are
110 not apparent for other crops. Although temperate systems tend to be hurt less from a given amount of
111 warming in many model assessments (15), in reality these systems often have much lower non-climatic
112 constraints, for instance because of high fertilizer rates, which increases their sensitivity to weather (9).
113 Moreover, temperate systems tend to warm more quickly than tropics (16), and as shown in Fig.1 several
114 high latitude growing regions have seen dramatic warming since 1980.

115 Any model has its limitations, and we recognize a few caveats that are common to statistical
116 models. Our approach may be overly pessimistic as it does not fully incorporate long-term adaptations
117 that may occur once farmers adjust their expectations of future climate. Examples of this would include
118 expansion of crop area into cooler regions, switches to new varieties (17), or shifts towards earlier
119 planting dates, although there is little evidence that the latter is happening beyond what is expected from

120 historical responses to warm years (18). Moreover, the incentives to innovate have been limited in most of
121 our sample period as prices have been low. On the other hand, our estimates may be overly optimistic
122 because data limitations prevent us from explicitly modeling effects of extreme temperature or
123 precipitation events within the growing season, which can have disproportionately large impacts on final
124 yields (19). For example, while we capture the decline in growing season total precipitation for wheat in
125 India, there has also been a trend towards increased fraction of rain in heavy events which is likely
126 harmful to wheat yields (20).

127 Finally, we note that the current study does not consider the direct effect of elevated CO₂ on crop
128 yields that are captured in the smooth time trends. Atmospheric CO₂ concentrations at Mauna Loa,
129 Hawaii have increased from 339 ppm in 1980 to 386 ppm in 2008 (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/).
130 Free-air CO₂ enrichment (FACE) experiments for C₃ crops (i.e., wheat, rice, and soybean) show an
131 average yield increase of 14% in 583 ppm compared to 367 ppm (or 0.065% increase per ppm (21)). This
132 suggests that the 47 ppm increase since 1980 would have boosted yields by roughly 3%. Impacts of
133 higher CO₂ on maize were likely much smaller because its C₄ photosynthetic pathway is unresponsive to
134 elevated CO₂ (22). Thus, the net effects of higher CO₂ and climate change since 1980 have likely been
135 slightly positive for rice and soybean, and negative for wheat and maize (Table 1).

136 The fact that climate impacts often exceed 10% of the rate of yield change indicates that climate
137 changes are already exerting a considerable drag on yield growth. To further put this in perspective, we
138 have calculated the impact of climate trends on global prices using recent estimates of price elasticities for
139 global supply and demand of calories (23). The estimated changes in crop production excluding and
140 including CO₂ fertilization (columns (5) and (7) of Table 1, respectively) translate into average
141 commodity price increases of 18.9% and 6.4% when we use the same bootstrap procedure as Table 3 in
142 (22).

143 The current study considers production of four major commodities at national scales. There are
144 many important questions at sub-national scales that our models cannot address, many important foods
145 beyond the four modeled here, and many important factors that determine food security besides food
146 production. Nonetheless, we contend that periodic assessments of how climate trends are affecting global
147 food production can provide some useful insights for scientists and policy makers. Much needed to
148 compliment this type of analysis are studies that evaluate the true pace and effectiveness of adaptation
149 responses around the world, particularly for wheat and maize. By identifying countries where the pace of
150 climate change and associated yield pressures are especially fast, this study should facilitate these future
151 analyses. Without successful adaptation, and given the persistent rise in demand for maize and wheat, the
152 sizable yield setback from climate change is likely incurring large economic and health costs.

153

154 **Figures:**

155 1) Maps of the 1980-2008 linear trend in (a) temperature and (b) precipitation for the growing season of
156 the predominant crop (among maize, wheat, rice, and soybean) in each 0.5 x 0.5 grid cell. Trends are
157 expressed as the ratio of the total trend for the 29-year period (e.g. °C per 29 years) divided by the
158 historical standard deviation for the 1960-2000 period. For clarity, only cells with at least 1% area

159 covered by either maize, wheat, rice, or soybean are shown. Temperature trends exceed more than twice
160 the historical standard deviation in many locations, whereas precipitation trends have been less dramatic.

161 2) The frequency distribution of country level growing season temperature (top) and precipitation
162 (bottom) trends for 1960-1980 (left), and 1980-2008 (right) for four major crops, with trends expressed as
163 the total trend for the period (e.g. °C per 29 years), divided by the historical standard deviation for the
164 1960-2000 period. The null distribution (derived from 10,000 runs with simulated random noise) is
165 shown by gray line, reflecting the frequency of different trends expected by chance. The distribution
166 across countries of precipitation trends for both 1960-1980 and 1980-2008, and temperature trends for
167 1960-1980, do not appear different than expected from random variation. In contrast, the temperature
168 distribution for 1980-2008 is shifted relative to the null distribution, with temperature trends often two or
169 more times larger than the historical standard deviation.

170 3) Estimated net impact of climate trends for 1980-2008 on crop yields for major producers and for global
171 production. Values are expressed as percent of average yield. Gray bars show median estimate and error
172 bars show 5-95% confidence interval from bootstrap resampling with 500 replicates. Red and blue dots
173 show median estimate of impact for T trend and P trend, respectively.

174 4) Estimated net impact of climate trends for 1980-2008 on crop yields by country, divided by the overall
175 yield trend per year for 1980-2008. Values represent the climate effect in the equivalent number of years
176 of overall yield gains. Negative (positive) values indicate that the climate trend slowed (sped up) yield
177 trends relative to what would have occurred without trends in climate.

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
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Table 1. Median estimates from this study of global impacts of temperature and precipitation trends, 1980-2008, on average yields for four major crops. Estimates of the 47 ppm increase in CO₂ over the time period were derived from data in (21). Values in parentheses show 5th-95th percentile confidence interval estimated by bootstrap resampling over all samples.


Crop	Global Production (1998-2002 average, million metric tons)	Global yield impact of temperature trends (%)	Global yield impact of precipitation trends (%)	Subtotal	Global yield impact of CO ₂ trends (%)	Total
Maize	607	-3.1 (-4.9, -1.4)	-0.7 (-1.2, 0.2)	-3.8 (-5.8, -1.9)	0.0	-3.8
Rice	591	0.1 (-0.9, 1.2)	-0.2 (-1.0, 0.5)	-0.1 (-1.6, 1.4)	3.0	2.9
Wheat	586	-4.9 (-7.2, -2.8)	-0.6 (-1.3, 0.1)	-5.5 (-8.0, -3.3)	3.0	-2.5
Soybean	168	-0.8 (-3.8, 1.9)	-0.9 (-1.5, -0.2)	-1.7 (-4.9, 1.2)	3.0	1.3

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
(A) Linear Trend in Temperature, 1980–2008 (sd)




(B) Linear Trend in Precipitation, 1980–2008 (sd)




(A) Growing Season Temperature Trend (1960–1980, # of sd)



(C) Growing Season Temperature Trend (1980–2008, # of sd)



(B) Growing Season Precipitation Trend (1960–1980, # of sd)



(D) Growing Season Precipitation Trend (1980–2008, # of sd)

