



REDUCING TRANSPORT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

Trends & Data

2010



The International Transport Forum is a strategic think tank for the transport sector. Each year, it brings together Ministers from over 50 Countries, along with leading decision-makers and thinkers from the private sector, civil society and research, to address transport issues of strategic importance. An intergovernmental organisation within the OECD, the Forum's goal is to shape the transport policy agenda, and ensure that it contributes to economic growth, environmental protection, social inclusion and the preservation of human life and wellbeing.

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FOREWORD

This document provides a brief update of GHG emission trends from the transport sector and discusses the outcome of the United Nations Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change held in December 2009 in Copenhagen. It is based on material collected for the OECD-ITF Joint Transport Research Committee's Working Group report on GHG emission reduction strategies which will be released in 2010.


1. REDUCING TRANSPORT GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRENDS & DATA 2010

- Transport-sector CO₂ emissions represent 23% (globally) and 30% (OECD) of overall CO₂ emissions from Fossil fuel combustion. The sector accounts for approximately 15% of overall greenhouse gas emissions.
- Global CO₂ emissions from transport have grown by 45% from 1990 to 2007, led by emissions from the road sector in terms of volume and by shipping and aviation in terms of highest growth rates.
- Under “business-as-usual”, including many planned efficiency improvements, global CO₂ emissions from transport are expected to continue to grow by approximately 40% from 2007 to 2030 – though this is lower than pre-crisis estimates.
- Road sector emissions dominate transport emissions with light-duty vehicles accounting for the bulk of emissions globally. In certain ITF member countries for which estimates can be made, road freight accounts for up to 30% to 40% of road sector CO₂ emissions though the breakdown amongst freight vehicle classes varies amongst countries. Emissions from global aviation and international shipping account for 2.5% and 3% of total CO₂ emissions in 2007.
- Some countries (e.g. France, Germany and Japan) stand out in that they have seen their road CO₂ emissions stabilise or decrease even before the recession of 2008-2009 despite economic and road freight growth over the same period.
- The economic crisis of 2008 has led to a prolonged downturn in economic activity and has had to the sharpest drop in emissions in the past 40 years (estimates range from 3% to 10%). Depending on the strength of the economic recovery, may translate into approximately 5% to 8% decrease in 2020 emissions from their pre-crisis projected levels.
- The outcome of Copenhagen Climate Summit has not provided a strong signal supporting future emission reduction efforts for either developed or rapidly developing countries. Early analysis of both low and high ambition pledges by countries following Copenhagen finds that mitigation action is unlikely to constrain global average temperatures to less than a 2 degree celcius rise which is the threshold for dangerous climate change identified by the IPCC.

Global emissions of GHG's rose 61% from 1970 to 2005 – or roughly 1.4% per year (Figure 1-1)¹. CO₂ emissions largely dominate and have risen 86% (excluding forest fires and post-burn decay) between 1970 and 2005 or 1.8%. Of the estimated 45.4 Gt of GHGs (CO₂ eq.) emitted globally in 2005, approximately 59% - ~27 Gt. CO₂ eq. - resulted from the combustion of fossil fuel.

1. According to EDGAR 4.0 data. (IEA, 2009b), estimates global GHG emissions in 2005 to be less at 42.4 GT CO₂eq. with the following breakdown: 27.1 Gt CO₂(64%) from energy, 1.3 Gt CO₂(3%) from industrial processes, 3.8 Gt CO₂ (9%) from Land use change and forestry, 6.4 Gt CO₂ eq. (15%) of Methane, 3.3 Gt CO₂ eq. (8%) of Nitrous Oxide and 0.5 Gt CO₂ eq. (1%) of F-gases.


Figure 1-1: Global Anthropogenic Emissions of Greenhouse Gases: 1970-2005



Source: EDGAR 4.0, 2009

Transport accounts for a significant share of the global fossil fuel combustion-related CO₂ emissions. Total fossil fuel-related CO₂ emissions increased from 20.9Gt in 1990 to 28.8Gt in 2007, of which transport accounted for 4.58 (1990) and 6.63 (2007) Gt, representing an increase of approximately 45% (IEA, 2009). According to the World Energy Outlook 2009, global energy-related CO₂ emissions could increase to over 40Gt by 2030 and transport emissions would make up over 9Gt of that despite significant mitigation policies built into the reference scenario (Figure 1-2).


Figure 1-2: Projected world energy-related CO₂ emissions (Mt)



Source: (IEA, 2009)

According to Figure 1-3, the transport sector (including international aviation and maritime) was responsible for 23% of world CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion (30% for OECD countries) in 2005 with the road sector largely dominating. When factoring in all GHG emissions, transport CO₂ emissions accounted for approximately 14.5% of global GHG emissions – *but this figure is much more tentative given the significant uncertainties in the absolute amount of GHG emissions, especially from agriculture, forestry and biomass decay.*


Figure 1-3: GHG and CO₂ Emissions 2005



Source: EDGAR 4.0 (JRC/PBL) 2009 and IEA

Electricity production, road transport and industrial activity dominate global CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion and the former two sectors, along with international shipping and aviation, have experienced higher global growth rates than any other source sector (Figure 1-4).


Figure 1-4: Sources of Global CO₂ Emissions 1980-2004 (Mt CO₂)



Source: data from (IEA, 2009)

Few countries disaggregate emissions data by freight versus passenger transport but a reasonable proxy can be calculated using fleet composition, fuel consumption and carbon intensity data. Figure 1-5 displays such an estimate of the breakdown between freight versus passenger CO₂ emissions from road transport for a selected number of countries. With the exception of China, CO₂ emissions from freight transport accounts for 30%-40% of the total road sector emissions though the breakdown amongst freight vehicle classes varies somewhat more amongst countries.

Figure 1-5: Estimated Breakdown of Freight Versus non-Freight Road CO₂ Emissions (Mt CO₂) in Selected Countries (2005)



Source: IEA/ITF MOMO data

According to IEA data, international maritime activity (calculated by the sale of fuel to vessels whose next port-of-call is outside the country) accounted for 610.4 Mt of CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion in 2007. Figures on fuel use and emissions from international maritime activity, however, are less accurate under current IEA reporting requirements² than for road, aviation and other transport sectors. An error ranging between 25% for cargo ships and a factor of two for the world fleet can be found by contrasting international maritime transport fuel sales data with activity-based estimates of ship energy requirements (Corbett & Köhler, 2003) (Eyring, Köhler, van Aardenne, & Lauer, 2005)³.

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2. International marine “bunker” fuel statistics were not conceived to represent the total energy used by ships engaged in global commerce. Rather, these data were designed to differentiate fuel stocks that are covered by the allocation regime of the IEA’s emergency oil sharing system and those that are not. Some researchers find that this leads to an erroneous estimate of maritime fuel use.
 3. While early IEA estimates of maritime energy use seem to better match activity-based estimates, a clear divergence has emerged in later years. A primary cause of divergence between total fuel use and international fuel sales would perhaps be increased multiple-port calls within a nation over time. This change in voyage behaviour is consistent with the rise of containerized shipping during the 1970-1980 decade where increasing divergence would be expected during rapid transition to multi-port containerized logistics, followed by stabilized container service patterns and constant differences between fuel usage and statistics.


The International Maritime Organization’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has estimated CO₂ emissions from shipping on the basis of a bottom-up, activity-based model. In its April 2009 report “Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: Phase 2 Report” (Buhaug, et al., 2009) it presents a consensus estimate of CO₂ emissions from *all* ocean ship activity of 1054 Mt in 2007 of which 870 Mt result from *international* shipping (955 Mt and 795 Mt, respectively in 2005). This represents 38% more than the IEA’s estimate of 2007 CO₂ emissions from marine bunkers and places international shipping between the 2007 national emissions of Japan and Germany. The new estimate of CO₂ from international shipping accounts for approximately 3% of world CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2007.

IEA estimates that global international aviation accounted for 411.6 Mt of CO₂ emissions in 2007 and 400.2Mt in 2006 (IEA, 2009). Figures for global domestic aviation were 334.0Mt and 330.3Mt, respectively in 2007 and 2006. For 2006, the IEA’s combined international and domestic aviation CO₂ emissions estimate (730 Mt) is approximately 15% higher than the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) 2006 estimate of 632 Mt which can be partially explained by the fact that ICAO does not include fuel use by embarked auxiliary power units and excludes visual flight rules flights and non-scheduled flights in regions not covered by radar (ICAO, 2009). IEA data may also contain some military-related fuel use and emissions when these are not segregated in national reporting data.

Figure 1-6 shows total CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel (including international bunkers assigned to countries on the basis of national sales) by ITF region and country. North America and the top-ten CO₂-emitting non-ITF/OECD countries⁴ dominate representing 55% of world emissions. While the EU 27 trails North America within the ITF, the bulk of EU 27 emissions take place in the founding 15 members of the EU. The ITF countries as a whole accounted for approximately 60% of world CO₂ emissions. Respective shares for the EU, ITF Asia-Pacific and other ITF countries (dominated by Russia and India) are 14.6%, 7.9% and 13.2%, respectively.


4. Brazil, China (including Hong Kong), Islamic Republic of Iran, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand,

Figure 1-6: Total CO₂ Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion (including International Transport) in 2007 by ITF Region and Country



Source: data from (IEA, 2009)

Figure 1-7: Transport CO₂ Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion in 2007 by ITF Region and Country



Source: data from (IEA, 2009)

Figure 1-8: Total CO₂ Emissions (Mt) by Region⁵ and % Growth by Sector (Including International Aviation and Maritime Transport⁶): 1990-2007



Source: data from (IEA, 2009)

Figure 1-7 shows total transport-related CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels (including international bunkers assigned to countries on the basis of national sales). North America largely dominates other regions, including the top ten non-ITF countries indicating that a large share of the latter's CO₂ emissions comes from non-transport activity. As with total CO₂ emissions, EU 15 emissions represent a dominant share of EU27 emissions, and the United States, Japan and Russia largely dominate the transport-related CO₂ emissions from their respective regions. Combining international transport emissions with total domestic transport emissions, as done in this figure, can bias the analysis of some nations' true emissions – especially where small countries operate large international ports or airports

5. See Appendix I for breakdown of regions

6. By region of fuel sale

serving a wider region, as in the case of the Netherlands. Combined, emissions from international aviation and international maritime transport (IEA, not IMO, estimate – see above) are higher than all but one country and higher than all but one world region.


Figure 1-8 displays the regional breakdown of CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion and tracks the growth rates in emissions from 1990 to 2007 across different sub-sectors. Growth in CO₂ emissions has been variable across these regions but the highest emitting regions have almost all experienced growth in overall CO₂ emissions (EU-15 +7%, N. America +21%, ITF Asia-Pacific +39%). Growth has been fastest in the top-ten non-ITF countries where overall emissions grew by 142% between 1990 and 2007. China alone experienced 172% growth in CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion over the same period.

Growth rates of emissions from the main CO₂ emitting sectors also vary by region, but the highest emitting regions have seen significant growth in transport-related CO₂ emissions. EU transport sector emissions are rising faster in the new EU states (+61% – albeit from a much smaller base) than in the EU-15 (+33%), but the latter have seen an 85% increase in aviation emissions over the same period. North America has experienced roughly similar rates of growth for energy, transport and aviation – and this, from a much higher base (+31%, +29% and +10%, respectively). ITF North Asia-Pacific has seen growth in emissions from all sectors. The growth in transport sector emissions in this region (+39%) has been lower than the growth in aviation and maritime transport for these countries (+65% and +104%, respectively).

Russia dominates the emissions of the other ITF countries and because of the structural changes experienced there in the beginning of the 1990's, CO₂ emissions have dropped across all sectors for the period 1990-2007. This trend is reversing and transport emissions have seen a 17% growth across these countries since 2000 driven by growth in Russia and India. Mirroring trends in overall emissions, growth in transport-sector CO₂ emissions for the top ten non ITF economies have risen dramatically over the past 15 years. Transport-sector emissions have risen by 141%, aviation emissions by 157% and international maritime emissions by 203%. However, the relative weight of the transport sector is much less in these countries.

Adjusting for those countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that experienced large structural adjustments in the early 1990's, the general trend has been for a near-continuous increase in transport-related CO₂ emissions in most economies. Some countries (e.g. France, Germany and Japan – see Figure 1-9) however, stand out in that they have seen their road CO₂ emissions stabilise or decrease even before the recession of 2008-2009 despite economic and road freight growth over the same period. There are many factors at play in this trend including changes in fuel taxation in Germany leading to some cross-border fuelling (which would not show up in Germany's IEA CO₂ statistics). However, a stabilisation or drop in road passenger traffic and the impact of better light-duty fuel economy have played an important role in all three countries, along with a drop in average traffic speeds in France and better freight truck load factors in Japan.

Figure 1-9: Evolution of Road Transport CO₂ Emissions, Road Passenger Kilometres, Road Freight Kilometres and GDP: 1995-2007



Source: ITF data and (IEA, 2009)

Relative Indicators of Transport GHG Emissions

The previous section addressed the absolute levels of GHG and CO₂ from International Transport Forum (ITF) countries. Obviously some countries and regions emit more CO₂ than others as a result of a number of factors (e.g. population size and demographic growth, travel distances, climate, power sources and level of economic activity). Accounting for emissions per capita and/or emissions per unit of economic activity allows a common benchmark for comparing national or historical emissions. Figure 1-10 displays per-capita emissions of CO₂ from the transport sector (including international aviation and maritime, allocated by country of sale of fuel) and transport CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP in 2007 for all International Transport Forum Countries and the top-ten largest CO₂ emitting non-ITF economies.


Per capita emissions of CO₂ from transport (excluding international aviation and maritime) among ITF countries varied from 6.5 tonnes in the USA⁷ to 0.1 tonnes in India. The average per capita emissions of transport CO₂ is 1.5 tonnes for ITF countries which is considerably higher than the per capita emissions of the principal CO₂-emitting non-ITF countries (e.g. China per capita emissions of CO₂ from transport are 3.6 tonnes).

Levels of transport CO₂ emissions per dollar of GDP (PPP, 2000 USD) are more balanced among most ITF countries. The average GDP intensity of transport CO₂ emissions for International Transport Forum (excluding international aviation and maritime) countries is 0.10 kg of CO₂ per dollar of GDP.

Generally, wealth creation and economic growth has been accompanied by rising per-capita CO₂ emissions from transport activity. Countries differ in the relative per capita transport CO₂ intensity of their growth. For instance, Turkey, Denmark, Hungary, New Zealand, Austria and Portugal all experienced roughly the same rate of per-capita GDP growth but displayed a very wide range of per-capita transport CO₂ emissions growth. Even if many countries have been able to increase per-capita GDP at relatively lower rates of growth of transport CO₂ emissions, the absolute increase in transport-sector CO₂ emissions from these countries is not negligible.

7. Luxembourg shows 18 tonnes per capita but this is largely due to petrol sales to non-Luxembourg residents spurred by low relative fuel tax rates.

Figure 1-10: Per-Capita and Per-GDP Emissions of Transport CO2 in 2007
 (including international aviation and maritime transport, allocated by country of fuel sale)



Source: Data from IEA

Impact of the 2008 economic crisis


The economic crisis of 2008 has led to a prolonged downturn in economic activity and has had a significant impact on CO₂ emissions. The IEA has estimated that growth rates of CO₂ emissions dropped sharply in 2008 and absolute emissions of GHGs dropped more in 2009 than at any other time in the past 40 years (IEA, 2009). This decrease in emissions should have a lasting impact on the rate of growth of CO₂ concentrations given the long atmospheric life of CO₂.

According to the IEA, emissions in 2009 are projected to be as much as 3% lower than 2008 emissions leading to as much as 5% lower 2020 emissions from their pre-crisis projections. The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (den Elzen, Mendoza-Beltran, van Vliet, Bakker, & Bole, 2009) estimates more pessimistically that the crisis will contribute to a 10% drop in global GHG baseline emissions in 2010. Assuming that GDP growth returns to its previous trajectory and remains unchanged in its scope, this translates to an 8% reduction from projected baseline 2020 GHG emissions. The US Energy Information Agency, in its 2009 International Energy Outlook (US EIA, 2009) projects a smaller impact on global CO₂ emissions but notes that world regions will not be affected uniformly – it estimates that OECD regions will see a net drop in CO₂ emissions due to the crisis but that overall emissions will continue to rise (albeit at a slower rate) led by continued growth in emissions in Asia and in China in particular.

Already, many countries have noticed a drop in GHG emissions – for instance, the US Environmental Protection Agency has announced a 3.2% drop in CO₂ emissions from 2007 to 2008 (US EPA, 2010) and the US Energy Information Agency expected a 5.9% drop in emissions from 2008 to 2009 (see Figure 1-11) which turned out to be less than the final 6.6% drop it recorded in its April 2010 Short-Term Energy and Summer Fuels Outlook (US EIA, 2010). CO₂ emissions from transport have dropped most steeply in 2008 (-5.7% from 2007 levels) wiping out more than 7 years of emissions growth (transport sector emissions in 2008 were 1.3% below their 2000 levels). While the steep oil prices of 2008 contributed to this decrease in emissions in transport, the US Energy Information Administration also notes the impact of drops in energy use related to the manufacturing and industrial sector which has been hit hard by the downturn. In its most recent assessment, the EIA projects a slight upturn in overall US CO₂ emissions in 2010 and 2011 (+2.2% and +1.1% year-on-year growth rates respectively) but does not believe emissions will recover their 2008 levels by 2011. This is a faster recovery than had been expected by the EIA – at least for 2010 (US EIA, 2010). Emissions from petroleum use have dropped less than the overall average (-5% from 2008 to 2009) but are expected to recover at a lower rate than overall emissions (+0.7% and +0.9% year-on-year growth rates, respectively, in 2010 and 2011).

The ultimate long-term impact of the recession on GHG emissions will depend on the form of the recovery. A convergence back to previous growth paths and a continuation of past economic patterns will quickly lead back to steeply rising GHG emissions in the absence of robust GHG mitigation policies. A convergence back to previous growth paths on the basis of changed and lower-carbon economic activity will see lower rates of GHG emissions than before. Changes in trading patterns and production and consumption patterns that seek to alleviate energy shock risks might also see reduced GHG emissions from past business-as-usual trends. Finally, should economic activity not return to previous levels or should the recession last longer than expected, GHG emissions would likely deviate from the pre-crisis growth trajectories.

**Figure 1-11: Oil price, GDP and CO₂ emissions in the USA 1990-2010
(2009-2010 data provisional)**



Source: (US EIA, 2009)

1.1.1. Post-Copenhagen GHG reduction targets

In December 2009, COP 15 in Copenhagen concluded with no agreement on a legally-binding international agreement regarding GHG emissions after 2012. COP-15 did take note of the hastily negotiated “Copenhagen Accord” (see box) and decided to put off to COP 16 (December 2010) agreement regarding the replacement to the Kyoto Protocol. Many countries have announced new mitigation commitments and voluntary actions in the run-up to Copenhagen and in response to the Copenhagen Accord’s call for both binding GHG reduction targets from Kyoto Annex 1 countries and declarations of voluntary Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by other parties to the UNFCCC. These are summarised in Table 1-1, Table 1-2 and Table 1-3.

Table 1-1: Copenhagen Accord Quantified Emission Reduction Targets for Annex I countries as of 31 January, 2010

Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -5 % from 2000 levels by 2020 if acting unilaterally • -15 per cent by 2020 if other major developing economies make comparable efforts • -25% by 2020 if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal to stabilise levels of CO₂ equivalent at 450 parts per million or lower (-20% cap-and-trade + -5% from international credits)
Belarus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • between -5% and -10% from 1990 levels by 2020 (conditional on access to Kyoto mechanisms, capacity building and accounting for transitioning to a market economy)
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -17% from 2005 levels by 2020
Croatia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -5% from 1990 level by 2020 (to be replaced with a negotiated target upon accession to EU)
European Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -20% from 1990 levels by 2020 • -30% by 2020 if other countries adopt strong targets
Iceland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -30% from 1990 levels by 2020 (linked to the EU high ambition goal and conditional upon comparable efforts from other Annex I countries)
Japan:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -25% from 1990 levels by 2020
Kazakhstan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -15% from 1990 levels by 2020
Lichtenstein	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -20-30% from 1990 levels by 2020 (aligned with EU target)
Monaco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -30% from 1990 levels by 2020 (using Kyoto mechanisms as well as national mitigation)
New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -10-20% from 1990 levels by 2020 (conditional on a global agreement consistent with a less than 2° C temperature rise, significant action by non-Annex I countries, agreed rules on LULUCF and full recourse to a global carbon market).
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -30% GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2020 • -40% if other countries adopt similar targets
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • -15 to -25% from 1990 levels by 2020 conditional on LULUCF and a legally binding international agreement.
USA:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approximately -17% below 2005 levels by 2020 (depending on the passage of national legislation)

Source: UNFCCC

The "Copenhagen Accord" and other outcomes of COP-15

COP 15 in Copenhagen ended on 19 December, 2009 without establishing a legally-binding framework for replacing the Kyoto Protocol. Progress on resolving the two-track negotiation covering signatories of the Kyoto Protocol (the “KP Track”) and all UNFCCC parties (under the Ad Hoc Working Group for Long-Term Cooperative Action or the “LCA-track”) stalled in the final hours. After a last-minute negotiation amongst a small group of major emitters, parties were presented with a 3-page “Copenhagen Accord” which was not adopted though the final plenary “took note” its’ contents. The final status of the so-called Copenhagen Accord is uncertain. Some countries would see it as a framework for a single new legally-binding agreement to be negotiated by COP-16 while many others would view it rather as an over-arching statement of principles to cover continued negotiations under the two-track progress. The main elements of the Copenhagen Accord (CA) are:

- action should be taken to limit the increase in global temperature to no more than 2°C against pre-industrial levels;
- emissions should peak as soon as possible;
- developed (Annex I) countries should submit non-binding 2020 emissions-reduction targets to the UNFCCC by end-January 2010 (See Table 1-1);
- developing countries should submit nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) to the UNFCCC by end-January 2010 (see Table 1-2);
- developed countries should provide \$30bn in financing to developing countries by end-2012, rising to \$100bn per year by 2020;
- measures should be established immediately to cut emissions from deforestation; and
- an assessment of the CA’s implementation should be completed by 2015, and should allow for a tightening of the 2°C target to 1.5°C if warranted.

There is no specific reference to transport in the Copenhagen Accord though meeting a 2°C emissions trajectory will most likely require important and counter-trend reductions in transport GHG emissions.

The COP-15 plenary also extended the negotiations in both the KP- and LCA-tracks with a view to agreeing a legally-binding treaty at COP 16 in Mexico (December 2010). This has potential repercussions for transport, not only because ambitious targets in either track would entail significant transport sector contributions but also because the way in which post-Kyoto mechanisms are defined will determine how well transport sector interventions might qualify for emission credits in developing countries. Under the Kyoto Protocol, only two transport-related project types qualified for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – largely because the type of transport sector interventions that would have had an impact on GHG emissions in developing country urban regions (e.g. development of public transport networks) were ill-suited to CDM methodology (which was more suited to site-specific energy and industrial projects). Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), as currently discussed in the two-track negotiations, might be more amenable to transport policies, especially if programmatic interventions (e.g. on a city-wide transport network) are recognised by the methodology. (For more information on integrating transport-specific concerns in NAMA’s, see www.transport2012.org)

One key transport-related outcome of COP-15 concerned the treatment of international aviation and shipping GHG emissions which, due to difficulty in allocating emissions from these global sectors, had been not been addressed in Kyoto GHG reduction targets. The decision was made to postpone the question of national allocation of emissions once again while negotiations continue in the LCA track regarding a global framework for addressing these international emissions. In the post-Copenhagen draft of the LCA agreement, a placeholder paragraph addresses emissions from international marine and aviation bunkers but no targets are agreed. Action within the IMO and ICAO will continue, though the lack of a firm mandate from Copenhagen will likely somewhat dilute efforts to seek rapid resolution on this matter.

Few countries address transport sector emissions in their national targets although a number of non-Annex-1 countries have identified NAMAs within the transport sector. One important exception is the proposed EU mandatory targets for non ETS sectors which *de facto* include a large transport component (see Table 1-3). Other transport-specific actions include the EU's decision to bring aviation emissions into the EU ETS and transport-specific GHG reduction targets set by Japan and the Netherlands.

Table 1-2: Pledges for nationally appropriate mitigation actions and targets by non Annex I countries as of February 11, 2010 (Copenhagen Accord submissions and prior announced actions)

Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -36.1 to -38.9% GHG emissions in 2020 compared to BAU projection
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> peak in GHG emissions by 2012 become 'carbon neutral' by 2021
China:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -40% to -45% CO2 emissions per unit of GDP from 2005 levels by 2020 (aspirational). Increase share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 15% by 2020 (aspirational).
India	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -20% to -25% CO2 emissions per unit of GDP from 2005 levels by 2020 (aspirational).
Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -26% GHG emissions from BAU projection by 2025.
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -20% CO2 emissions from BAU projection by 2020 from BAU (aspirational) by increasing share of renewable energy to 10% of total and a 20% reduction in electricity consumption
Maldives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achieve carbon neutrality by 2020
Marshall Islands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -40% CO2 emissions from 2009 levels by 2020.
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -30% GHG emissions from BAU projection by 2020 (aspirational) -50% below 2000 levels by 2050 (aspirational)
Moldova	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least -25% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020.
Papua New Guinea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -50% GHG emissions from 2009-2010 by 2030. Achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.
Singapore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -16% GHG emissions from BAU projection by 2020 (conditional on international agreement)
South Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -30% GHG emissions from BAU projection by 2020 -50% by 2050
South Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -34% GHG emissions from BAU projection by 2020 -42% GHG emissions from BAU projection by 2025
The Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -5% in 2012 compared to 1990 (aspirational)

Source: National communications, UNFCCC, WRI 2009 and Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2009

Table 1-3: Other Non-Copenhagen Accord-related National and Regional GHG Targets and Actions


EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target to reduce 20% of the EU's total primary energy consumption by 2020 from what it otherwise might have been. Inclusion of international and domestic aviation emissions in the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS). An obligation to reach, in aggregate (with different national targets) a 20% share of renewable energy in the EU's final energy consumption by 2020. An obligation for each member state to reach a target of least 10% renewable energies in transport by 2020. Proposed mandatory national targets for sectors not covered by the EU ETS (principally Transport, Residential, Agriculture and Waste) from 2005 to 2020 as follows: <table> <tbody> <tr><td>AUT= -16%</td><td>BEL= -15%</td><td>BGR= +20%</td><td>CZE= +9%</td><td>DEU= -14%</td></tr> <tr><td>DNK= -20%</td><td>EST= +11%</td><td>FIN= -16%</td><td>FRA= -14%</td><td>GRC= -4%</td></tr> <tr><td>HUN= +10%</td><td>IRL= -20%</td><td>ITA= -13%</td><td>LVA= +17%</td><td>LTU= +15%</td></tr> <tr><td>LUX= -20%</td><td>NLD= -16%</td><td>POL= +14%</td><td>PRT= +1%</td><td>ROM= +19%</td></tr> <tr><td>SVK= +13%</td><td>SVN= +4%</td><td>ESP= -10%</td><td>SWE= -17%</td><td>GBR= -16%</td></tr> <tr><td>CYP= -5%</td><td>MLT= +5%</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </tbody> </table>	AUT= -16%	BEL= -15%	BGR= +20%	CZE= +9%	DEU= -14%	DNK= -20%	EST= +11%	FIN= -16%	FRA= -14%	GRC= -4%	HUN= +10%	IRL= -20%	ITA= -13%	LVA= +17%	LTU= +15%	LUX= -20%	NLD= -16%	POL= +14%	PRT= +1%	ROM= +19%	SVK= +13%	SVN= +4%	ESP= -10%	SWE= -17%	GBR= -16%	CYP= -5%	MLT= +5%			
AUT= -16%	BEL= -15%	BGR= +20%	CZE= +9%	DEU= -14%																											
DNK= -20%	EST= +11%	FIN= -16%	FRA= -14%	GRC= -4%																											
HUN= +10%	IRL= -20%	ITA= -13%	LVA= +17%	LTU= +15%																											
LUX= -20%	NLD= -16%	POL= +14%	PRT= +1%	ROM= +19%																											
SVK= +13%	SVN= +4%	ESP= -10%	SWE= -17%	GBR= -16%																											
CYP= -5%	MLT= +5%																														
Germany:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -40% GHG emissions from 1990 by 2020 12% biofuels by 2020 																														
France:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -75 GHG emissions from 1990 by 2050 -2%/yr energy intensity improvement (energy consumption to GDP) to 2015 and -2.5%/yr energy intensity improvement from 2015 to 2030. 																														
Iceland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -50-75% from 1990 levels by 2050 (aspirational) 																														
Japan:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -30% energy use from 2003-2030. Absolute target of 250 Mt CO2 from transport in 2010 from a baseline of 260 Mt in 2002 (compare to 217 Mt in 1990) which represents 24 Mt below the 2010 "business-as-usual" projection. 																														
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -30% GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2020 Transport GHG emissions to be cut by 13-17 Mt below the 2020 "business-as-usual projection". 2% reduction in energy consumption annually. 20% renewable energy in 2020. 																														
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carbon neutral by 2030 (aspirational) 																														
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -20% GHG emissions by 2020 (-30% if other countries adopt ambitious targets) 																														
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4% renewable energy by 2020 																														
United Kingdom:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -80% GHG emissions from 2000 levels by 2050 (CO2) 																														
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -30% reduction of GHG emissions in 2025 and a 42% reduction in 2030 from 2005 levels (pending legislative outcome of climate change law) Reduce GHG emissions 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 (-73% from 1990 in 2050 from cap-and-trade)(pending legislative outcome of climate change law) Voluntary Federal target of -18% GHG intensity compared to 2002 levels by 2012. Federal mandate for 9 billion gallons of biofuels in 2008 and 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022 																														
California:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -80% GHG emissions from 1990 by 2050 (CO2) 																														
NE and Mid-Atlantic States (USA):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GHG reduced to 2005 levels by 2009-2012 minus a further 10% by 2015-2018 																														

Source: National communications, UNFCCC, WRI 2009 and Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2009

Figure 1-12 shows the annualised actual changes in CO₂ emissions and contrasts these with the yearly changes implied by the absolute emission reduction targets set out by some countries (here we examine the lower ambition pledges when countries have provided a range of efforts). As noted earlier, several economies in transition have seen large drops in emissions from 1990. These countries are currently below their 2020 emissions target and, if they can contain future emissions, should meet these (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Russia). While not displayed here, this is also the case for several new EU Members as well. Germany (-1.69% per year from 1990 to 2020 for a total of -40%) has the most challenging yearly reduction burden of the countries examined here though the implied emission reduction rate of the United States, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and Iceland are all above 1% per year. The EU 27 has a relatively easier burden at only -0.74% per year though this reflects early action undertaken to reduce emissions since 1990 (compared to the 2005 baseline chosen by the United States and Canada which does not account for emissions growth from 1990 to 2005).

From 2007 on to 2020, those countries that have seen emissions rise fastest from 1990 to 2007 and those countries which have selected ambitious reduction targets will face a significant yearly reduction burden (over 3% reduction in emissions per year for Norway, New Zealand, Iceland and Japan). The EU, the United States and Canada all face roughly similar yearly reduction rates though they have different base year dates. When looking at a common 1990 baseline, the emissions reduction pledge of the United States are significantly smaller than those of the EU and Japan.

Figure 1-12: Level of effort implied by recent national GHG targets and emission reduction commitments (% change per year)



* Targets selected from the lower end of the range of announced targets with the exception of the mid-range target for Australia (see Table 1-1, Table 1-2 and Table 1-3**Error! Reference source not found.**).

** 1990 is the base year for all countries represented here except Australia (2000) and the United States and Canada (both 2005)

Source: Emissions data from IEA, targets from UNFCCC

According to analysis by the World Resources Institute, the EU, Japan and the US each face roughly similar efforts in terms of reduction of overall per-capita GHG emissions implied by the 2020 CA targets (-24%, -24% and -29%, respectively) when compared to 1990 levels though when compared to 2005 emissions, the EU's burden (-14%) is roughly half that of Japan and the US (-26% and -27%, respectively) highlighting early emissions reduction in the EU. In terms of the GHG intensity of their respective economies, the CA targets imply slightly less similar levels of GHG intensity reduction per unit of GDP for all three regions (-58%, -61% and -53%, respectively, for the EU, Japan and the United States in a fast GDP growth scenario from 1990 levels and -39%, -48% and -43%, respectively, from 2005 levels). In all cases (slow vs. fast growth, 1990 baseline vs. 2005 baseline) the effort implied is

significant – the carbon productivity of the economy will have to improve by ~30% to over 50% with Japan facing the highest burden in these three regions (Levin & Bradley, 2010). Perhaps more important than the level of effort implied by these commitments is the fact that in almost all instances, countries will have to either reverse CO₂ emission trends or accelerate emission reductions already underway. Meeting these commitments will imply significant and growing efforts from the transport sector.

1.1.2. Implied climate stabilisation impacts and carbon costs of targets, pledges and actions


Bearing in mind the inherent difficulties and imprecision in linking emissions reductions to climate change impacts (especially against BAU projections for a future date), a number of efforts have sought to gauge if COP 15 pledges would more-or-less meet a 2° climate goal.

In October 2009, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency released a report examining what impact current targets, pledges and actions would have on climate stabilisation goals and global abatement costs and carbon prices (den Elzen, Mendoza-Beltran, van Vliet, Bakker, & Bole, 2009). It examines the pledges made in the Copenhagen round of climate talks (as of August 2009) and assesses these against a 450 ppm CO₂eq. target. This trajectory would require cuts in emissions from Annex I countries on the order of 25% to 40% along with GHG emission cuts of 15%-30% from developing countries – mainly from a small set of large-emitting and fast growing States.

The study examines three scenarios. The first is based on emission cuts along the lower range of existing pledges (“low ambition”), the second examines the impact of emission cuts along the high range of existing pledges and planned actions (“higher ambition” and the final scenario assumes emission cuts such that the 2° limit has a good chance of not being surpassed on the basis of “comparable efforts” amongst Annex I countries⁸ (-30% from 1990) and ambitious non-Annex I countries (-16% excluding LULCF⁹ and REDD¹⁰, and -19% including these). Figure 1-13 shows the potential emission reductions from each scenario in 2020 – keeping in mind that approximately a reduction of approximately 14 GtCO₂ eq. would be more-or-less in line with the 450 ppm stabilisation trajectory.

-
- 8. The notion of “comparable efforts” is one further developed in another report of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency “Invalid source specified..
 - 9. Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry CO₂ emissions
 - 10. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing countries

Figure 1-13: Modelled impact of 2009 (August) GHG emission reduction pledges, targets and actions



* Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries

Source: (den Elzen, Mendoza-Beltran, van Vliet, Bakker, & Bole, 2009)

According to (den Elzen, Mendoza-Beltran, van Vliet, Bakker, & Bole, 2009), both the low and high pledges of Annex I countries as of August 2009 would lead to 10%-15% less GHG emissions than the 1990 baseline (-11% to -16% including the Japanese government pledge to reduce GHG emissions by 25% from 1990 levels). If the new surplus “Hot air” resulting from Russia and Ukraine having submitted pledges above baseline levels is not used, the potential Annex I reduction increases to 14% to 19% below the baseline level. In all cases, the study finds that pledges from Annex I countries are significantly less than the -25% to -40% reduction implied by the 450 ppm stabilisation scenario. Overall, combined Annex I and non-Annex I efforts fall between 54%-62% short of emission reduction compatible with a 450 ppm stabilisation trajectory in the low ambition scenario and between 35%-42% short in the higher ambition scenario. The study finds, however, that some countries and regions are closer to the levels of reduction modelled under the “comparable effort” scenario which would keep to a 450 ppm stabilisation trajectory. This is the case for the high pledges of the EU, the US and Japan (Figure 1-12).

Conservative estimates of reduction actions that could be undertaken by non-Annex I countries (excluding land use- and forestry-related actions) would lead to an emissions reduction of large and/or fast growing emerging economies in the order of 5%-11% below the 1990 baseline. This too is less than the -15% to -30% emission reduction from developing countries in order to assure a 450 ppm stabilisation trajectory.

More recently, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) has assessed COP-15 pledges and actions by developed and developing countries estimating that these would result in the following reductions (Hohne, et al., 2009):

- Developed countries: from minus 2.3 GtCO₂eq in 2020 for low ambition pledges to 5.4GtCO₂eq for high ambition pledges.
- Developing countries: minus 3.6GtCO₂eq in an “optimistic” interpretation of the impact of identified NAMAs.

When measured against a projected global BAU estimate of 57 GtCO₂eq in 2020 finds that COP 15 pledges and actions (9GtCO₂eq) are insufficient to meet an emissions reduction trajectory that would have a good chance to limit warming to 2°C (44GtCO₂eq in 2020 -- 450ppm atmospheric concentration). Under low-ambition pledges, PIK suggests that average global temperatures might rise by 3.5°C by 2100 (representing an atmospheric GHG concentration of 700 ppm) and under the most ambitious scenario joining developed country high pledges and developing country NAMAs, temperature change might be reduced to 3.2°C (650 ppm) by 2100 (Hohne, et al., 2009).

Other estimates of the impact of post-Copenhagen pledges and actions by the World Resources Institute and MIT’s Sustainability Institute also find that emissions trajectories are set to exceed the 2°C objective, with MIT’s Sustainability Center projecting an increase of 3.9°C by 2100. UNEP, reviewing available studies in February 2010 notes that there is “low confidence (e.g. a two in ten chance) that the two degree limit will be met under current commitment/mitigation actions to reduce emissions listed in the Copenhagen Accord” (UNEP, 2010).

(den Elzen, Mendoza-Beltran, van Vliet, Bakker, & Bole, 2009) finds that the costs associated with Annex I pledges and targets would represent approximately 0.01% to 0.04%, respectively, of GDP in 2020 for the low and higher ambition scenarios. The “comparable effort” scenario which would be consistent with not surpassing 2° would cost approximately 0.24% of Annex I country GDP. These are averaged values and the study finds that abatement costs would differ significantly between certain countries. If emission reduction only takes place domestically (e.g. no international emissions trading), costs are projected to multiply by a factor of 4 to 13.

The study estimates that abatement costs as a percentage of GDP are lower in developing countries and that some countries may experience net gains if trading is allowed. Again, certain developing countries would possibly face higher abatement costs than others. For example, under the “comparable effort” scenario, advanced developing countries may face costs as high as 0.3% to 0.5% of GDP which is as high as or higher than Annex I abatement costs under the same scenario. This implies that these countries might compete with Annex I countries for emission credits if they participate in an international trading scheme.

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APPENDIX 1

Composition of world regions used in this report:

EU-15 (countries belonging to the EU prior to May 1, 2004)

- ⇒ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland (Republic of), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

EU-New (The 12 countries having joined the EU since May 1, 2004)

- ⇒ Bulgaria, Cyprus¹¹, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

International Transport Forum - North America

- ⇒ Canada, Mexico, United States

International Transport Forum - Asia Pacific

- ⇒ Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand

International Transport Forum - Other

- ⇒ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, India, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine

10 Top CO2 Emitting non International Transport Forum Countries

- ⇒ China (including Hong Kong), Islamic Republic of Iran, Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Malaysia

11. Southern part of the island as there is no single authority representing the whole of the island.

APPENDIX 2

National Transport-Related and GHG Emissions Data:

These tables contain detailed data on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from fossil fuel combustion in member countries of the International Transport Forum.

A number of data sources are used in these tables:

Population and GDP data are from the International Energy Agency. GDP data is expressed in purchasing power parity (2000 \$).

Data on transport volumes (passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres) are collected from national administrations by the Statistics division of the International Transport Forum.

Data on motorisation rates comes from the World Bank.

Data on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (and CO₂ emissions in particular) come from national reports to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and from the International Energy Agency.

International Energy Agency (IEA) energy figures are based on the default methods and emissions factors from the Revised 1996 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.


Important Cautionary Note:

There are many reasons why the IEA estimates may not be the same as the numbers that a country submits to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), even if a country has accounted for all of its energy use and correctly applied the IPCC Guidelines. In addition, the IEA presents CO₂ emissions calculated using both the IPCC Reference Approach and the IPCC Tier 1 Sectoral Approach. In some of the non-OECD countries, there can be large differences between the two sets of calculations due to various problems in some energy data. As a consequence, this can lead to different emission trends between 1990 and 1999 for certain countries. For more details, visit the IEA web-site.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM MEMBERS


Country Sheets

Albania



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Armenia



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Australia

EU-27


N. America

Asia-Pacific

ITF-other

408.1 Mt

Top 10 non-ITF



Transport and the Economy	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	1990-2007	% per year**
Population (millions)	17.17	18.19	19.27	19.53	19.75	19.99	20.23	20.53	20.82	21.14	23%	1.23%
GDP PPP (billion 2000 US dollars)	369.00	433.48	524.77	544.54	561.71	584.32	600.97	618.72	638.43	666.78	81%	3.54%
Road passenger km (million pkm)	218200	239832	257906	255942	261879	268378	278350	279111	277516	282362	29%	1.53%
Road and Rail freight tkm (million tkm)	169548	212469	265848	274091	292746	307314	322122	344702	357360	376143	122%	4.80%
Road pkm/capita	12708.21	13184.83	13383.81	13105.07	13259.70	13425.61	13759.27	13595.28	13329.30	13356.76	5%	0.29%
Road and Rail freight tkm/\$ of GDP	0.46	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.56	0.56	0.56	23%	1.21%
Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants	450	478	524	531	542	1.25%
CO2 Emissions												
IEA CO2 from fuel combustion (Mt)*	266.24	293.73	348.77	361.78	367.43	369.02	377.9	396.68	401.52	408.06	53%	2.54%
... of which transport CO2 (Mt)*	67.82	75.39	84.36	84.18	84.05	86.8	87.37	90.02	88.31	90.07	33%	1.68%
Transport* as a percentage of total	25.5%	25.7%	24.2%	23.3%	22.9%	23.5%	23.1%	22.7%	22.0%	22.1%		
Road (Mt)	54.5	57.84	64.92	63.45	66.62	68.15	68.28	69.66	67.27	67.23	23%	1.24%
Rail (Mt)	1.71	1.52	1.79	1.81	1.48	1.52	1.63	2.09	1.86	1.92	12%	0.68%
Domestic Aviation (Mt)	3.09	5.23	5.49	6.04	5.44	5.87	5.99	5.41	6.38	5.65	83%	3.61%
International Aviation (Mt)	4.29	5.75	7.15	7.95	6.29	6.86	6.92	8.1	7.29	9.13	113%	4.54%
Domestic Navigation (Mt)	2.06	1.87	1.53	1.82	1.1	1.31	1.06	1.19	1.07	2.16	5%	0.28%
International Shipping (Mt)	2.14	2.79	2.96	2.57	2.4	2.4	2.75	2.81	3.21	2.67	25%	1.31%
Other Transport (Mt)	0.02	0.4	0.52	0.53	0.72	0.7	0.73	0.76	1.23	1.31	6450%	27.89%
GHG Emissions												
UNFCCC GHG emissions (Mt CO2 eq.)*	422.67	450.05	505.04	516.22	516.80	524.69	530.94	534.19	545.25	553.17	31%	1.60%
UNFCCC GHG fuel combustion (Mt CO2 eq.)*	263.68	290.32	335.98	342.18	345.96	358.78	363.61	369.69	376.53	382.50	45%	2.21%
... of which transport GHG (Mt CO2 eq.)*	68.55	76.84	85.09	84.02	84.87	84.59	88.65	88.56	89.42	90.77	32%	1.67%
Road (Mt)	54.33	58.88	65.92	64.41	66.68	67.37	70.79	69.58	68.84	68.53	26%	1.38%
International Aviation (Mt)	4.38	5.90	7.39	7.86	6.75	5.97	6.03	6.90	8.12	9.35	113%	4.56%
International Shipping (Mt)	2.08	2.70	2.80	2.63	2.87	2.79	2.82	2.65	2.65	2.65	27%	1.43%

* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Austria

EU-27
71.3

N. America





Asia-Pacific

ITF-other

Top 10 non-ITF

Change 1990-2007*


	Mt	2007	T/capita	2007	Kg/\$2000 PPP	2007
Total CO ₂		71.34		8.57		0.27
Transport CO ₂	25%	25.6	15%	3.08	-16%	0.10
Road CO ₂	77%	22.66	63%	2.72	19%	0.09
Aviation CO ₂	74%	2.21	60%	0.27	17%	0.01
Shipping CO ₂	140%	0.05	122%	0.01	62%	0.00
			131%		68%	



Transport and the Economy	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	1990-2007	% per year**
Population (millions)	7.68	7.95	8.01	8.04	8.08	8.12	8.18	8.23	8.28	8.32	8%	0.47%
GDP PPP (billion 2000 US dollars)	179.49	198.73	230.22	231.42	235.23	237.12	243.15	250.14	258.58	266.51	48%	2.35%
Road passenger km (million pkm)	67722	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Road and Rail freight tkm (million tkm)	21697	28594	33756	34451	34959	35010	35310	33953	39825	40019	84%	3.67%
Road pkm/capita	8817.97	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Road and Rail freight tkm/\$ of GDP	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	24%	1.28%
Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants	387	447	501	520	493	499	503	..	507	1.70%
CO2 Emissions												
IEA CO2 from fuel combustion (Mt)*	57.02	60.04	63	66.79	69.13	74.34	75	75.7	75.64	71.34	25%	1.33%
... of which transport CO2 (Mt)*	14.5	16.73	20.34	21.53	23.32	25.03	25.98	26.7	25.49	25.6	77%	3.40%
Transport* as a percentage of total	25.4%	27.9%	32.3%	32.2%	33.7%	33.7%	34.6%	35.3%	33.7%	35.9%		
Road (Mt)	13.06	14.93	17.84	19.17	21.25	22.95	23.56	23.85	22.67	22.66	74%	3.29%
Rail (Mt)	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.18	0%	0.00%
Domestic Aviation (Mt)	0.1	0.07	0.1	0.12	0.12	0.24	0.29	0.33	0.34	0.53	430%	10.31%
International Aviation (Mt)	0.82	1.29	1.63	1.57	1.47	1.26	1.48	1.67	1.75	1.68	105%	4.31%
Domestic Navigation (Mt)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.05	150%	5.54%
International Shipping (Mt)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Transport (Mt)	0.32	0.28	0.61	0.53	0.33	0.43	0.49	0.59	0.5	0.5	56%	2.66%
GHG Emissions												
UNFCCC GHG emissions (Mt CO2 eq.)*	79.93	81.85	82.79	86.75	88.59	94.58	93.52	94.81	93.59	90.16	13%	0.71%
UNFCCC GHG fuel combustion (Mt CO2 eq.)*	56.00	58.67	60.57	64.74	66.05	72.04	71.94	73.01	71.19	67.40	20%	1.10%
... of which transport GHG (Mt CO2 eq.)*	14.92	17.34	20.84	22.03	23.85	25.58	26.46	27.32	26.04	26.42	77%	3.42%
Road (Mt)	13.53	15.47	18.25	19.58	21.69	23.44	23.97	24.48	23.20	23.46	73%	3.29%
International Aviation (Mt)	0.90	1.34	1.71	1.67	1.56	1.47	1.74	1.98	2.07	2.20	145%	5.42%
International Shipping (Mt)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00


* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Azerbaijan




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Belarus




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Belgium




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Bosnia and Herzegovina




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Bulgaria




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Canada




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Croatia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Czech Republic




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Denmark




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Estonia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Finland




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

France




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

FYR of Macedonia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Georgia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Germany




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Greece




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Hungary




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Iceland




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

India



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Ireland



Italy

EU-27


458.2 Mt

N. America

Asia-Pacific


ITF-other

Top 10 non-ITF



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Japan



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Korea

EU-27


N. America

Asia-Pacific

ITF-other


529.0 Mt

Top 10 non-ITF




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Latvia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Lithuania




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Luxembourg




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Malta




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Mexico




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Republic of Moldova




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Netherlands



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

New Zealand



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Norway

EU-27

N. America





Asia-Pacific

ITF-other

Top 10 non-ITF

Change 1990-2007*

	Mt	2007	T/capita	2007	Kg/\$2000 PPP	2007
Total CO ₂		30%	40.07			40.1 Mt
Transport CO ₂		41%	17.72			
Road CO ₂		42%	10.79			
Aviation CO ₂		40%	2.08			
Shipping CO ₂		40%	4.71			




REDUCING TRANSPORT GHG EMISSIONS - Trends & Data 2010, © OECD/ITF 2010

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	1990-2007	% per year**
Transport and the Economy												
Population (millions)	4.24	4.36	4.49	4.51	4.54	4.57	4.59	4.62	4.66	4.71	11%	0.62%
GDP PPP (billion 2000 US dollars)	112.63	135.25	162.05	165.28	167.76	169.46	176.01	180.83	184.95	190.75	69%	3.15%
Road passenger km (million pkm)	47327	48482	53091	54162	55517	56344	56645	57327	57661	59207	25%	1.33%
Road and Rail freight tkm (million tkm)	9864	11301	14792	15220	15300	15672	16983	18079	18488	18767	90%	3.86%
Road pkm/capita	11162.03	11119.72	11824.28	12009.31	12228.41	12329.10	12340.96	12408.44	12373.61	12570.49	13%	0.70%
Road and Rail freight tkm/\$ of GDP	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	12%	0.69%
Passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants	380	386	412	415	419	422	431	439	0.97%
CO2 Emissions												
IEA CO ₂ from fuel combustion (Mt)*	30.92	36.09	37.3	36.98	35.96	37.74	39.01	38.43	38.65	40.07	30%	1.54%
... of which transport CO ₂ (Mt)*	12.56	14.68	15.55	15.73	15.4	15.34	15.75	16.53	16.48	17.72	41%	2.05%
Transport* as a percentage of total	40.6%	40.7%	41.7%	42.5%	42.8%	40.6%	40.4%	43.0%	42.6%	44.2%		
Road (Mt)	7.6	8.73	8.79	9.11	9.25	9.35	9.77	9.87	10.18	10.79	42%	2.08%
Rail (Mt)	0.1	0.1	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	-60%	-5.25%
Domestic Aviation (Mt)	0.25	0.6	0.9	0.82	0.73	0.94	1.08	1.08	0.96	0.99	296%	8.43%
International Aviation (Mt)	1.24	1.09	1.05	1.07	1.18	0.62	0.72	0.8	1.11	1.09	-12%	-0.76%
Domestic Navigation (Mt)	1.98	1.98	2.19	2.15	2.12	2.62	2.5	2.55	2.6	2.66	34%	1.75%
International Shipping (Mt)	1.39	2.19	2.56	2.52	2.07	1.75	1.6	2.16	1.56	2.05	47%	2.31%
Other Transport (Mt)	0	0	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.1
GHG Emissions												
UNFCCC GHG emissions (Mt CO ₂ eq.)*	57.98	58.46	66.11	66.48	63.59	64.36	66.10	67.96	69.56	70.93	22%	1.19%
UNFCCC GHG fuel combustion (Mt CO ₂ eq.)*	34.78	37.76	43.87	45.13	43.68	45.08	46.24	48.65	51.44	51.53	48%	2.34%
... of which transport GHG (Mt CO ₂ eq.)*	19.61	21.12	26.11	25.53	23.80	24.18	25.67	28.65	31.12	31.80	62%	2.89%
Road (Mt)	7.74	8.23	8.54	9.06	9.16	9.31	9.62	9.79	10.09	10.32	33%	1.71%
International Aviation (Mt)	6.79	6.47	10.12	9.27	8.20	8.29	9.39	11.98	13.80	13.84	104%	4.28%
International Shipping (Mt)	1.49	2.28	2.63	2.62	2.09	2.08	1.99	2.28	2.29	2.04	37%	1.86%


* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Poland




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Portugal




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Romania




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Russian Federation




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Serbia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Slovak Republic




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Slovenia




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Spain




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Sweden




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Switzerland




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Turkey




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Ukraine




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

United Kingdom



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

United States




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TOP 10 CO₂-EMITTING NON-ITF ECONOMIES


Country Sheets

China (including Hong Kong)




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Brazil




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Chinese Taipei



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Indonesia



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Islamic Republic of Iran

EU-27


N. America

Asia-Pacific

ITF-other

Top 10 non-ITF


471.7 Mt



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
* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Kazakhstan




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Malaysia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Saudi Arabia




* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

South Africa



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

Thailand



* includes emissions from international aviation and international maritime bunkers - there is no internationally agreed allocation mechanism for these and totals here are indicative of the scale of these emissions, not of their national "ownership" ** available yrs.

